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The paper argues that Emerging Market economies (EMs) face financial 
vulnerabilities that weaken the effectiveness of a domestic Lender of Last Resort 
(LOLR).  As a result, monetary policy is inextricably linked to the state of the 
credit market.  In particular, the central bank should be ready to operate as LOLR 
during Sudden Stop (of capital inflows) by releasing international reserves in an 
effective manner.  These conditions also impact on optimal monetary policy in 
normal but high-volatility periods.  The paper further argues that during those 
periods interest rate rules may engender excessive volatility of exchange rates 
and, thus, that it may be advisable to temporarily supplement those rules by 
foreign exchange market intervention or outright exchange rate pegging.  At a 
fundamental level, the analysis suggests that the state-of-the-art  literature 
summarized by Woodford (2003) or even more heterodox approaches exemplified 
by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) are likely fall short of providing a satisfactory 
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1. Introduction 
 
“A nice art collection and quiet surroundings do not a First World central bank make” should be 
the motto of every central banker in Emerging Market economies (EMs).  This is especially true 
during tranquil times in which both the level and volatility of interest rate spreads are low, and 
the central bank easily forgets its role as Lender of Last Resort (LOLR)—thus entirely focusing 
on its role as guarantor of price stability in a full-employment setting.  Unfortunately, as the 
high-volatility episode in May/June 2006 reminded us,
1 tranquil times may quickly turn into 
periods in which an EM central banker looks more like a high-wire performer without a safety 
net than a sedate analyst whose primary objective is to find the best specification for a Taylor 
Rule. 
Fortunately, experienced central bankers are well aware of these facts and have acted 
accordingly.  Since 1998, for example, Latin America has increased its stock of international 
reserves twofold, while Asia (including China) has done so by a factor of three.  This followed 
the Asia 1997 and Russia 1998 crises, which left no doubt that a Sudden Stop (of capital inflows) 
and attendant liquidity crunch can hit both saints and sinners.  However, this type of policy 
reaction is still less than fully incorporated into central banks’ tool kit—which remains replete 
with sophisticated analyses on how to implement Inflation Targeting, for example, with little or 
no reference to financial imperfections in EMs.
2 
The objective of this note is to help to redress the balance by bringing to the fore two 
distinguishing characteristics of EMs, namely, Sudden Stop and Liability Dollarization (foreign-
exchange denominated debts).
3  Special emphasis will be placed on Domestic Liability 
Dollarization (DLD), i.e., domestic residents’ dollar debts vis-à-vis the domestic banking system.  
These financial features seriously weaken the central bank’s role as LOLR, but they have been 
                                                 
1 The expectation that the Fed would further tighten monetary policy caused a major fall in EM stock market prices 
and rise in credit spreads.  Interestingly, the episode carried no noticeable cost in terms of output and employment. 
2 Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001), and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) are exceptions in which the 
incidence of Liability Dollarization and Sudden Stop are explicitly taken into account. The recent book by Mishkin 
(2006) offers a balanced and cogent exposition of the central issues that motivate the present note. 
3 In what follows, “dollar” will be identified with “foreign exchange.”  In Eichengreen et al. (2005) Liability 
Dollarization is instead called Original Sin.  The expression “Original Sin” invokes the thought that EMs may not be 
able to clean the slate, which is still a highly debated issue. To be fair, Liability Dollarization is not free from 
semantic imprecision either (e.g., is the US Liability Dollarized?), but I will stick with it for the present, albeit with 
some uneasiness.   5
largely ignored in the literature which, true to form, has focused on issues relevant to mature 
economies.
4 
Section 2 will start by defining LOLR, arguing that EMs are likely to have a somewhat 
ineffective LOLR.  The discussion will then turn to the use of international reserves during 
Sudden Stop.  It will be argued that proper management of Sudden Stop episodes should be high 
on the central bank’s agenda, because they may deteriorate long-term growth prospects, despite 
the fact that those episodes are not everyday events.  Section 3 will discuss some aspects of 
monetary policy under normal conditions, but under the assumption of a largely ineffective 
LOLR.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Lender of Last Resort in EMs 
 
1.  Lender of Last Resort (LOLR).  A LOLR is an institution that is able to lend at reasonably 
low rates of interest to sectors (public or private) that are seriously credit constrained.  Typically, 
this role is carried out by the central bank (and this will be assumed in what follows). 
  An effective LOLR either has resources of its own (e.g., international reserves) or is able 
to borrow in the open market at reasonable interest rates.  The U.S. Fed is an example of the 
latter type.  Under these circumstances, the LOLR does not interfere with its role as guarantor of 
price stability.  To a large extent, the two types of activities are independent of one another.  This 
has not been the case in most EMs. 
  Consider, for example, a Sudden Stop episode.  The economy as a whole—including the 
central bank and the other branches of government—undergoes a sudden, highly unexpected, 
curtailment of international credit (see Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía, 2004, for an empirical 
definition).  Thus, beyond international reserves, central bank loans have to be financed by 
seigniorage, i.e., printing money, interfering with the central bank’s role as guarantor of price 
stability. 
  The LOLR in EMs may also be ineffective in less extreme cases.  Suppose, for example, 
that there is a run on domestic banks in response to rumors of a financial crisis (i.e., a potentially 
self-fulfilling banking crisis).  This is an episode akin to the bank run during the U.S. Great 
Depression (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  An effective LOLR would quickly gain control 
                                                 
4 For example, the expression Lender of Last Resort does not appear in the Index of Woodford (2003), a masterful 
state-of-the-art exposition of monetary theory.  Neither is the LOLR or related DLD issue addressed in Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (2003), a book that otherwise places great emphasis on domestic financial imperfections.   6
of the situation by extending necessary loans to banks in order for the run not to cause costly 
withdrawals of credit lines to the private sector.  This operation need not have any impact on 
prices or the exchange rate because the central bank would simply be accommodating a higher 
demand for liquidity.
5  The situation would be different, however, if some of the liquidity held by 
the private sector consisted of foreign exchange, for example, a phenomenon called Currency 
Substitution in the literature, which is highly prevalent in developing countries (see Calvo and 
Végh, 1999).  In that case, increasing domestic liquidity may not be neutral, as in the previous 
instance.  Unless this operation is swiftly accompanied by foreign exchange intervention, the 
increase in domestic liquidity could give rise to a sharp increase in exchange rates and prices.
6  
  Let us now consider the situation one period before the LOLR is called into action and 
assume that the private sector is fully aware of this.  Under an effective LOLR, the expectation 
that the LOLR will go into action will come as a relief, since it ensures that a major financial 
accident will be avoided.  However, if the LOLR is ineffective, the situation is radically 
different.  The private sector would realize that very soon the money-printing press will likely go 
into overdrive, pushing prices and exchange rates sharply upwards.  Moreover, if the situation is 
triggered by Sudden Stop, or domestic prices are sticky, the real exchange rate will also increase 
which, combined with DLD, compromises the health of the banking system, potentially 
paralyzing the payments system.  Thus, just a basic understanding of this scenario will drive the 
private sector to take precautionary action by means such as withdrawing bank deposits.  Most 
likely, this will be reflected in higher and more volatile interest-rate spreads, having a negative 
impact on the credit market and possibly triggering some early LOLR activity.  
2.  Sudden Stop: The role of international reserves.  A Sudden Stop is, first and foremost, a credit 
event.  Typically, the country as a whole finds itself bereft of dollar credit, and it makes perfect 
sense that the international reserves of the central bank are made available to the public.  Table 1 
shows that this has been the general practice during Sudden Stop episodes since 1980 (see Data 
Appendix).  Central banks lost large quantities of international reserves, and neither reserve 
                                                 
5 Notice that in this instance the central bank can lend without borrowing because the episode corresponds to a 
situation in which there is a sudden higher demand for central bank liquidity.  Perhaps a better characterization of 
the central bank in this instance would be as Liquidity Provider instead of LOLR. 
6 To prevent that a change in liquidity composition will bring about a bank run, some central banks have allowed 
foreign-exchange deposits.  Thus, individuals could change liquidity composition from “peso” to “dollar” without 
withdrawing their bank deposits.  A major drawback of allowing dollar deposits is that they may be a major factor 
behind the creation of DLD.   7
losses nor exchange rate depreciations are significantly different across exchange rate regimes 
prevailing prior to Sudden Stop.
7 
 
Table 1. Media Test 












      
FLEXIBLE      
      
Mean -15.435  -1.625  26.435 
Standard Error  (3.512)***  (0.365)***  (7.162)*** 
Observations 30  30  30 
      
FIXED      
      
Mean -19.238  -2.267  20.495 
Standard Error  (2.246)***  (0.326)***  (8.795)** 
Observations 90  87  90 
      
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
FLEXIBLE AND FIXED
d/      
Mean 3.802  0.643  5.940 
Standard Error  (4.388)  (0.595)  (15.816) 
      
a/ Percentage difference between the minimum level of international reserves during a Sudden Stop and the pre-crisis 
level. 
b/ Calculated using one-year lagged GDP. 
c/ Percentage difference between the maximum exchange rate during a Sudden Stop and its pre-crisis level. 
d/ Test t of difference in medias.  
Note: The exchange rate regime correspond to 1-year lagged of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) three-way 
classification.  
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
Under normal central bank operations, reserves are made available to the public through 
what is usually called Foreign Exchange Intervention, FXI, which in this case amounts to selling 
foreign exchange for domestic currency at an exchange rate lower than the one that would 
prevail if the central bank did not intervene.  Thus, at the margin, FXI is tantamount to fixing or 
pegging the exchange rate.  Table 1 thus implies that, as a general rule, during Sudden Stop 
                                                 
7 Thus, under Sudden Stop there is no such a thing as “fixers” or “floaters,” they are all “mixers!”   8
central banks are likely to switch to some form of fixed or pegged exchange rate system.  Notice 
that if, contrariwise, the central bank insisted on letting the exchange rate do all the work, then 
international reserves would remain in its vaults, unless, of course, the central bank devises less 
standard schemes for disposing of international reserves.   
An interesting example of non-standard ways for disposing of international reserves is an 
operation carried out by Brazil in August 2002 (see Financial Times, 2002), when the central 
bank employed some of its international reserves to make loans to the export sector through 
commercial banks.  This operation took place during an incipient Sudden Stop episode triggered 
by statements from incoming President Lula to the effect that his government might engage in 
some kind of public debt repudiation.  The operation appears to have been very successful.
8 
Assuming that during Sudden Stop it is optimal for the central bank to make its reserves 
available in order to cushion the effects of international credit crunch, what is better: FXI or 
directing credit to some critical sectors?  FXI has the advantage that the central bank needs to 
have only limited information about credit markets.  But a major disadvantage is that 
international reserves may just become Capital Flight, and have no positive effect on the real 
economy.  This instance cannot be discounted because during Sudden Stop the private sector 
operates under “poor visibility”—the Sudden Stop creates serious information gaps that militate 
against an efficient allocation of resources.  Thus, if the central bank believes that it can help to 
coordinate a “good” equilibrium and/or has better information than the market, limited as it 
might be, it may be advisable for the central bank directly to channel international reserves to 
sectors which, on net, display a positive marginal social return to the use of international reserves 
(much like Brazil attempted to do in 2002, although in each individual case not necessarily 
involving the export sector).
9  Clearly, for the success of this “surgical” operation, it is necessary 
for the central bank to be well on top of developments in domestic credit markets, given that, in 
addition, for this operation to be effective time is of the essence.  Moreover, every possible 
measure should be taken to prevent Moral Hazard.  Moral Hazard is a key issue, since even the 
expectation that the central bank will provide “cheap” credit during a Sudden Stop may induce 
inordinately large risk-taking by the private sector.  This is a well-known phenomenon in the 
                                                 
8 How common have been these types of directed credit operations in response to incipient Sudden Stop are 
unknown to me.  It is an interesting research topic.  Márcio Garcia, incidentally, suggests (personal communication) 
that in the case of Brazil the central bank may have been prompted to provide export credit because exporters had 
been forced to surrender to the central bank a large share of export proceeds. 
9 This issue will be revisited in Section 3.2 below.   9
banking sector and stands as an important rationale behind bank regulation.  Thus, if non-bank 
sectors are routinely bailed out during Sudden Stop, their debt management procedures should 
also be subject to government regulation.  In this respect, one possible market-friendly type of 
arrangement might be to ensure credit lines during Sudden Stop only to firms that would be 
ready to abide by central bank debt management regulations under normal conditions.  
These considerations suggest that, in order to manage monetary policy (including 
international reserves) properly, it is important for a central bank to take action on a moment’s 
notice. Thus, a sort of Sudden Stop Drill (much like Fire Drills) should be included in central 
bank activities during normal times.  Not being ready for action could be very costly.  According 
to a recent study by Cerra and Chaman Saxena (2005), deep financial crises are likely to result in 
a long-lasting growth decline, which can result in large welfare losses. These are not “purely 
cyclical” fluctuations that, as argued by Lucas (1995), are likely to entail small welfare losses 
(equivalent to just fractions of 1 percent of steady-state consumption).  Contrariwise, even a 
small decline in growth potential may bring about large welfare loss, especially if, realistically, 
growth and discount rates are approximately equal.  Therefore, proper management of monetary 
policy during Sudden Stop may be worth more than long periods of impeccable monetary policy 
under normal conditions (where fluctuations are likely to be purely cyclical). 
 
3. Normal Conditions but Imperfect LOLR 
 
There is a growing consensus in EMs that some form of Inflation Targeting (IT), implemented 
by the central bank by means of a reference or policy interest rate (hereafter Interest Rate 
Tweaking, or IRT), is a good system for normal and tranquil periods.  When volatility is high, 
though, typically IRT is replaced by other monetary policy instruments—FXI being at the top of 
the list.
10  For an illustration of such central bank sleight of hand one needs to go no further than 
the recent turmoil episode in May/June of 2006.
11  Unfortunately, IRT is generally identified with 
“floating exchange rates.”  Thus, to the man in the street, pegging the exchange rate during 
market turbulence may be tantamount to abandoning floating exchange rates.  Since pegged 
exchange rates have been demonized by the Fund as a key factor behind the string of financial 
crises that started with Mexico’s “Tequila” crisis in 1994/5, the change of monetary policy 
                                                 
10 See BIS (2005) for an interesting collection of central bankers’ views on foreign exchange intervention. 
11 For example, in June 2006 the central bank of Turkey’s net foreign exchange position declined by almost US$3 
billion in a short span of time, even though the IMF program called for floating exchange rates.   10
instruments raises suspicions that policymakers may have lost their way, further contributing to 
market volatility. 
It seems to me that time is high to clear the air about some concepts that are poorly 
defined or just wrong, and to try to provide some rationale for transitory instrument switching as 
the economy transitions between tranquil and turbulent periods in normal times.  Hopefully, 
greater conceptual clarity will help to make transitory instrument switching in the face of high 
volatility less traumatic.   
In the first place, IRT is not equivalent to floating exchange rates.  The standard textbook 
definition of floating exchange rates is a system in which the central bank sets money supply 
(e.g., monetary base) and exchange rates are determined by market forces.  In contrast, IRT sets 
an intertemporal price, i.e., an interest rate, not a monetary aggregate.  It is not hard to show, for 
example, in standard open-economy models (and abstracting from uncertainty or assuming 
complete contingent markets) that one could tweak the policy interest rate in order to keep the 
exchange rate or money supply constant—giving rise to fixed or floating exchange rates as the 
case may be.
12  Thus, as a first approximation, during tranquil times IRT is a system that 
encompasses most of the systems discussed in the literature, going from fixed to floating 
exchange rates.  Moreover, if IRT is used to implement Inflation Targeting, then the line between 
the resulting system and pegged exchange rate becomes really blurry.  To illustrate, consider the 
polar case in which the basket of goods whose price index is targeted by IT consists exclusively 
of foreign exchange (or only pure tradable goods); then IT is equivalent to exchange rate tablitas 
(i.e., preannounced exchange rates) made famous (or infamous) by exchange-rate-based 
stabilization plans in the Southern Cone during the 1970s and 1980s (see Calvo and Végh, 1999). 
There is, however, a subtle difference between exchange rate pegs and IRT, namely, the 
type of bond being employed. In IRT domestic bonds are typically employed, e.g., central bank 
debt instruments, denominated in domestic or foreign currency.  In contrast, for exchange rate 
pegs the central bank buys or sells foreign exchange, i.e., it employs foreign bonds.
13  Both 
procedures yield identical results if domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes—but 
would be different otherwise.  For example, if the probability of Sudden Stop goes up, interest-
                                                 
12 Assuming equilibrium uniqueness, an issue that will be discussed below. 
13 As shown in Calvo (1998) central banks could erase their tracks by recovering the stock of (gross) international 
reserves by buying back reserves in exchange for domestic bonds.  If they did so, then the fiscal implications of the 
two systems would be essentially the same.   11
rate spreads on domestic bonds may rise sharply, making IRT significantly more costly than 
pegging.  This is an example in which, if authorities believe that the market overestimates the 
probability of Sudden Stop, it might be optimal to switch from IRT to exchange-rate pegging.  If 
anything, this type of instrument switching would reinforce the implementability of 
government’s targets because it would result in a stronger fiscal stance.  In this example the 
instrument switch (which need not be permanent) involves no fundamentally different monetary 
policy because objectives are unchanged; the switch is only prompted by cost considerations.  
This theme, namely, that a transitory switch from IRT to exchange-rate pegging could just be a 
technicality and not a major monetary policy change, will be a leitmotif in the ensuing 
discussion.  
1.  Interest Rate Tweaking: A weak instrument during market turbulence?  In tranquil times 
many instruments are good for achieving monetary objectives.  Instruments, like captains, are 
truly tested only in choppy waters.  As noted, IRT can be so effective in tranquil times as to be 
able to closely mimic any standard exchange-rate system.  However, the situation could be quite 
different during market turbulence if capital markets are incomplete and the interest rate cannot 
be easily tied to random shocks.  Consider, for example, a log-linearized version of uncovered 
interest arbitrage condition, 
, 1 t t t i + κ = ε +       ( 1 )  
where εt+1 is the expected rate of devaluation between periods t and t+1, it is the policy interest 
rate from period t to t+1, and κt is a risk premium in period t (for simplicity, the international 
interest rate is set equal to zero).  Notice that, conditional on κt, εt+1 would also be the expected 
rate of inflation of purely tradable goods (assuming, for simplicity, that dollar inflation is zero).  
Thus, if i is set prior to knowing κ, the variance of expected inflation of tradable goods would 
equal that of κ.  If, for example, one proxies κ by the EMBI (as computed by J.P. Morgan), 
Figure 1 shows that κ’s monthly standard deviation has suffered major swings since 1991, 
reaching a staggering 300 basis points around the 1998 Russian crisis.
14  Under the above 
conditions, the resulting swings in tradables’ expected rate of inflation would be totally outside 
the control of the monetary authority.  This is especially worrisome in developing countries, 
                                                 
14 See Data Appendix for definition of variables.  Incidentally, EMBI and its volatility are positively correlated.  An 
OLS of these two variables measured in basic points and on monthly intervals for the period Jan 1991-August 2006 
with EMBI as dependent variable yields a coefficient of 0.06 on EMBI with a t-statistic of 9.16 (significant at 1% 
level).  The number of observations is 188, and R
2 = 0.35.   12
because empirical studies suggest that exchange rate volatility is detrimental to trade.  Since 
trade and growth appear to go hand in hand (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000), one is led to the 
conclusion that if the policy instrument (in this case the policy interest rate) cannot prevent high 
volatility, the central bank would be well advised to find another instrument that is more 
effective in that respect, albeit on a temporary basis.  FXI/exchange-rate-pegging is a natural 
candidate.  Pegging the exchange rate in a credible manner would significantly lower the 
volatility of εt+1, shifting its volatility to 
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the (now) market-determined it.
15,16  A central bank that follows IT may thus have strong 
incentives to peg the exchange rate during market turbulence, if tradable goods’ prices are a 
major item in their price index and/or there is a large pass-through coefficient.  Moreover, unless 
the pass-through coefficient is very close to unity, pegging will become even more attractive in 
the presence of DLD, because high exchange rate volatility is more likely to trigger serious 
financial turmoil, possibly driving the economy into a “bad” equilibrium.
17  Furthermore, it 
should be recalled that IRT is, by nature, a poor nominal anchor.  To show this in a simple 
                                                 
15 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) shows that in developing countries interest rates are substantially more, and exchange 
rates substantially less, volatile than in developing countries.  This is in line with the above observations since the 
data in the study corresponds to a period in which developing countries relied more on pegging than on IRT. 
16 In general, κ will be a function of the exchange rate regime.  However, this does not invalidate the statement made 
in the text, unless the exchange rate peg is subject to serious credibility problems. 
17 There appears to be a worldwide trend towards smaller pass-through coefficients.  This is typically seen as a 
desirable development because it makes it easier to decouple inflation from exchange rate fluctuations.  However, 
under DLD, small pass-through coefficients may increase the probability of financial distress.   13
manner, consider the case in which the central bank accommodates money supply in order to 
satisfy an exogenous interest rate target (for a thorough discussion of IRT rules, see Woodford, 
2003).  First, let us assume that prices are perfectly flexible and the demand for money is given 




=       ( 2 )  
where M and P are, respectively, money supply and the price level.  Thus, given i, any ratio M/P 
which satisfies equation (2) would be consistent with equilibrium.  Uniqueness is recovered in 
some sticky-price models, but non-uniqueness is still an implication in many models with 
rational expectations under interest-rate targeting (see, e.g., Calvo, 1983).   
  The above remarks do not directly apply to IRT, but they suggest that if the reference 
interest rate is not sufficiently responsive to other macro variables, equilibrium multiplicity could 
result, making IRT ineffective. The conjecture is right.  Consider an IRT rule in which i = φ(π,c), 
where function φ is the central bank’s policy function, and π and c stand for inflation and output, 
respectively.  Embedding this central bank reaction function in the closed-economy model in 
Calvo (1983), for example, it is easy to show (proof in the Technical Appendix) that if φπ < 1, 
nonuniqueness holds.  Moreover, to ensure (local) uniqueness, we must have φπ > 1 and φc > 0, 
which is in line with Taylor’s rule, for example.
18   
  Is this enough reason for comfort?  I don’t think so.  In the first place, notice that nominal 
anchoring is achieved as a result of price stickiness, not nominal money supply or pegging of the 
exchange rate.  Although evidence from the North suggests that price-setting mechanisms are 
stable, we lack systematic studies showing that the same degree of stability is displayed in EMs, 
especially during market turbulence.
19 
  The policy interest rate, which is controlled by the central bank, is just one of a number 
of interest rates existing in the market.  If, as is typically the case, the policy interest rate 
corresponds to short-term interest rates on central bank paper or its interbank equivalent, IRT 
will certainly affect the cost of that kind of liquidity, but it may have very little impact on overall 
                                                 
18 In Calvo (1983), π stands for expected inflation (i.e., the right-hand derivative of log price level).  Hence, the rule 
is made contingent on expected inflation.  However, as argued in Benhabib et al. (2003), nonuniqueness problems do 
not go away if i is set to react to lagged inflation. 
19 Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) show compelling evidence that price stickiness cannot be ruled out even 
in the context of large exchange rate devaluations.  However, they stop short of arguing that the price-setting 
mechanism remains invariant during those episodes.   14
liquidity.  Actually, I suspect that the disconnect we have recently seen between short and long 
rates of interest in the US and other advanced economies (called “a conundrum” by former Fed 
Chairman Greenspan) may reflect financial innovations that we still do not fully understand (e.g., 
Credit Default Swaps).  Moreover, such a disconnect is likely to be more common in EMs, given 
that they are undergoing a deep process of financial development (as the expression “Emerging 
Markets” is intended to suggest).  To illustrate these possible complications, consider the case in 
which the policy interest rate, denoted by i
cb, is the interest rate on money.  Thus, the demand for 
money (2) would become: 
). (
cb i i L
P
M
− =      ( 3 )  
Under these circumstances, setting i
cb puts at best a lower bound on i but otherwise leaves i 
completely unhinged, implying equilibrium indeterminacy.  It can easily be verified that 
indeterminacy would also hold if i
cb applied to any other financial asset yielding “liquidity” 
services.
20 
Therefore, the good news is that there are some reaction functions that ensure uniqueness 
under stable price-setting mechanisms.  But, on the other hand, the bad news is that IRT may 
possess “birth defects” yet to be discovered.
21  In contrast, Calvo and Végh (1993), for example, 
show in an open-economy version of the same sticky prices model where, in general, equilibrium 
is unique under pegged exchange rates, giving additional grounds for the belief that pegging 
(with enough international reserves, of course) could offer a more robust nominal anchor than 
interest rate tweaking.
22   
  There is an important parallel between pegging and tweaking.  In both cases money 
supply is endogenously determined.  This is an attractive feature given that the rapid pace of 
financial innovation has made it hard to assess the impact that individual monetary aggregates 
(M1, M2, etc.) have on prices and wages.  Advocates of flexible exchange rates, though, criticize 
pegging by arguing that, at best, it controls a small set of prices (i.e., prices of purely tradable 
                                                 
20 E.g., assets that directly or indirectly enter as arguments in utility functions.  See Calvo and Végh (1995) for a 
discussion. 
21 In the literature there are examples in which uniqueness is ensured even under interest rate targeting.  For 
instance, Woodford (2001) shows that uniqueness can be recovered if the primary fiscal surplus is exogenous.  
However, fiscal discipline becomes highly questionable in periods of financial distress.  
22 As shown in Calvo and Végh (1993) imperfect credibility could impair the effectiveness of exchange-rate-based 
inflation stabilization plans.  But the same applies to IRT, as can easily be shown in terms of Calvo (1983) or the 
model discussed in the Technical Appendix.   15
goods and services), leaving plenty of room for real exchange rate misalignment (especially for 
large and relatively closed economies like Brazil, for example).  This is a valid concern, 
especially under conditions of imperfect credibility (see Calvo and Végh, 1993).  However, as 
shown in previous example, tweaking is also subject to similar concerns.   
Taylor (2000), for example, recognizes these difficulties but appears to be more 
optimistic than my remarks convey.  Maybe, after all, simple IRT rules work for unruly EMs.  
There is, however, an aspect of the whole issue that we may have ignored, namely, financial 
market volatility.  Again, measuring it by EMBI’s volatility (see Figure 1), it is clear that it has 
shown a marked declining trend since its 1998 heights.  Thus, the recent apparent success of IRT 
rules in EMs could partly be a consequence of a more stable financial environment. 
Two clarifications are in order.  First, the above remarks should not be taken to imply that 
the central bank must freeze the exchange rate at the first sign of high volatility.  The implication 
is only that if high volatility is not just a passing nuisance, the central bank may be justified in 
setting bounds to the exchange rate.
23  Thus, my remarks are consistent with a situation in which, 
for example, in the face of high volatility the currency is allowed to devalue sharply but the 
central bank eventually resorts to FXI to lower exchange rate volatility.  Second, it should be 
noted that exchange rate pegging is not without problems either.  If the public is not prepared for 
the transitory policy change, the latter may contribute to even higher volatility and, possibly, to 
the emergence of Sudden Stop.  This underlies the importance of fully alerting the public that 
they should expect a transitory instrument switch as the economy transits into choppy waters. 
2.  International Reserves and Multiple Equilibria.  The above discussion suggests that FX 
Intervention could offer an effective remedy against excessive exchange rate volatility in the 
short run—which, by the way, provides a rationale for the fear of floating highlighted in Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002).  A strong believer in “fundamentals,” however, is likely to object, arguing 
that if IRT is ineffective, then FXI is bound to fail.  Although the argument cannot easily be 
dismissed when equilibrium is unique, it faces serious challenges when the economy displays 
multiple equilibria—a situation that receives some support in the literature (see, e.g., Calvo, 1998 
and 2005; and Obstfeld, 1996).  Under equilibrium multiplicity, policy can help coordinate 
“good” or “bad” equilibria.  International reserves could play a key role in this coordination 
                                                 
23 The emphasis here is on controlling “excessive” exchange rate volatility.  It should not be confused with trying to 
prevent real exchange rate misalignment, a policy that may result in weak nominal anchoring.   16
game, since, as pointed out above, they could help to cushion destructive financial spillovers of 
Sudden Stop.  But, of course, for that to be the case, (a) the stock of reserves has to be large 
enough, (b) reserves have to be wisely spent during crisis (as discussed in Section 2), and (c) the 
public has to trust that the government is prepared to use this kind of ammunition (including the 
use of external credit lines) to the full extent possible.   
As noted at the outset, several EMs have substantially increased their international 
reserves since 1998.  Some critics suggest that the stock is already too large by showing that 
these funds could get a much higher rate of return if invested in alternative financial assets.  
However, this is highly debatable.  The optimal stock of international reserves is a function of 
their potential use.  For example, if reserves are intended to fill the financing gap in case there 
are problems in rolling over external short-term debt (the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti 
criterion), then the levels prevailing in 2006 for Latin America, for example, could easily be 
claimed to be excessive, since the ratio of reserves to such debt hovers around 2.7 (about 30 
percent more than in 1994, prior to the “Tequila” crisis).  However, if reserves are intended to 
reinforce the LOLR, then aggregates like export credit and/or M2 could be a more appropriate 
denominator than external short-term debt—and the picture that emerges could be significantly 
different.  For example, in Latin America international reserves in 2006 are around 37 percent of 
M2, which is only about 10 percent higher than in 1994 (see Calvo, 1996b, for a discussion of 
these issues).
24, 25   
  Among the conditions discussed above, item (c)—namely, that the public expects that 
international reserves will be efficiently spent in case of Sudden Stop, thus guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the LOLR—requires good rapport between the central bank and the public.   
Assuming an adequate level of reserves, the central bank should be able to explain to the public 
that reserves are there to be used in case of incipient Sudden Stop, and in order to prevent a full-
fledged Sudden Stop.  Thus, the central bank should be able to convince the public that a loss of 
reserves is part of the solution, not part of the problem.  
                                                 
24 These figures are regional simple averages, and are based on data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, 
September 2006.  See Data Appendix for more information. 
25 It could be argued that if M2 is in local currency then international reserves are not needed, because the LOLR 
could always bail out banks by printing local currency.  It should be recalled, however, that as a general rule the 
money-printing solution brings about large nominal and real devaluation, possibly wreaking havoc in the financial 
sector (especially under DLD).  This is an empirical issue that cannot be discussed in this paper.    17
  The above discussion employed the phrase “international reserves” without providing a 
rigorous definition.  It is now time to try to be somewhat more precise (a more thorough 
discussion will be left for another occasion).  Let me begin with a couple of questions: What is 
the relevant concept, gross or net international reserves; and, if the relevant concept is net, net of 
what?  The IMF, for example, defines net international reserves by subtracting from gross 
reserves official short-term foreign-exchange denominated official debt.  These questions are 
highly relevant because a large share of the impressive accumulation of international reserves 
that took place in EMs since 1998 was carried out by increasing official debt (variously 
denominated in foreign exchange or local currency).  Thus, another question arises that comes 
closer to the heart of the issue: If reserves are accumulated by borrowing (i.e., by resorting to 
sterilized intervention), why would they be effective as insurance against Sudden Stop?
26 This is 
an important question that cannot be fully addressed in this paper.  Instead, I will focus on the 
particular case highlighted by the heading of this section, namely, multiple equilibria.  Suppose 
that international reserves are held in order to stave off “bad” equilibria.  This would tend to 
privilege “gross” over “net,” because gross reserves can be utilized to bail out exporters, for 
instance, even if those reserves had been acquired by issuing government obligations of equal 
value, currency denomination and maturity.  To be sure, this operation may not be a completely 
successful—as the 1994/5 “Tequila” crisis in Mexico illustrates (see Calvo, 2005)—but using 
international reserves may still be preferable to the grinding stop in exports that would otherwise 
inevitably follow if exporters (in the present example) are suddenly excluded from international 
credit markets.  On the other hand, I would not subscribe to an unqualified “gross” reserves 
concept.  Suppose, for instance, that the central bank accumulates reserves by placing debt in 
domestic banks’ balance sheets (a common fact in EMs).  In that case, a bailout of exporters 
would be undertaken at the expense of banks’ balance-sheet deterioration.  The latter, in turn, 
may give rise to bank runs, as depositors realize that banks have become more financially 
vulnerable, potentially leading to domestic payments difficulties, which could actually trigger a 
bad equilibrium.  This suggests a “net” concept that would subtract from gross reserves the stock 
of short-term debt held by domestic banks.  In contrast, I do not see much sense in subtracting 
external short-term debt as implied by the popular Greenspan-Guidotti criterion.  Not paying 
                                                 
26 Some observers conclude from the fact that much of the stock of international reserves is matched by government 
obligations that a mercantilist objective is behind the large accumulation of reserves—more concretely, a desire to 
generate an artificially high real exchange rate.   18
external debt carries costs but, as the recent Argentine default episode illustrates, domestic 
financial difficulties could far outweigh those of external origin.  Argentina’s freezing of 
deposits in domestic banks (labeled the “corralito,” the Spanish word for “playpen”) proved to 
be much more troublesome for Argentine policymakers than the default on obligations held by 
creditors such as the Italian pensioners who ended up venting their rage against their financial 
advisors, namely, Italian banks. In sum, the relevant concept of international reserves as 
insurance against Sudden Stop depends on domestic and international financial/political 
conditions that have to be weighed in each individual case.  Most likely, though, neither the 
standard gross nor net reserves definition fits the bill.  
In conclusion, the stock of (the relevant concept of) international reserves (or credible 
international credit lines) should be large enough to prevent a major credit crisis that paralyzes 
exports and threatens to cripple the domestic banking system, and the public should be well 
informed about bailout mechanisms.  The costs of this strategy may be significant, but they have 
to be weighed against the benefit of avoiding deep financial crises, which as Cerra and Chaman 
Saxena (2005) and the previous discussion suggest, could also be large.  Of course, this is 
unlikely to be the socially optimum for the world as a whole.  The counterpart of self-insurance 
is seigniorage accruing to developed economies (to the extent that the interest rates on developed 
economies’ treasury bills, for example, fall short of the opportunity cost of international 
reserves).  Thus, developed economies would be making monopoly profits that are distorting and 
unfair (especially if one looks at the issue from a Rawlsian perspective).  Nonetheless, it should 
be noted that fairer and more efficient insurance schemes  exist. One such scheme would be 
some kind of Contingent Credit Line (CCL), but perhaps a version that is more agile and free of 






Many EMs are at a serious disadvantage relative to developed economies in that they lack an 
effective Lender of Last Resort, a disadvantage that becomes more acute under Domestic 
                                                 
27 Ugo Panizza (personal communication) proposes to rebate to the world’s poorest countries’ seigniorage collected 
on account of their international reserve holdings.  A similar proposal was unsuccessfully bandied about in 
Washington when Argentina considered the possibility of adopting the US dollar as local currency.  However, the 
twist of doing this for the world’s poorest countries could prove politically appealing in this era of MDGs.   19
Liability Dollarization.  The economy’s fragility may not be noticeable in normal and tranquil 
times, but its fault lines are revealed during turbulent periods, even in the absence of a major 
crisis.  This paper has focused on the use of a reference or policy interest rate as an instrument 
for monetary policy.  Although this is the instrument of choice for developed economies, the 
paper claims that the instrument is inherently weak, and in the case of EMs it could become 
uncomfortably weaker during periods of high volatility.  Thus, in choppy waters it may be 
advisable momentarily to switch to more robust instruments such as some kind of exchange rate 
peg.  To ensure that instrument switching is not a source of confusion for the private sector, the 
central bank should explain the nature of the policy switch, hopefully well in advance of when 
that switch becomes necessary. However, the paper stops short of discussing what kind of rules 
are optimal for switching instruments back and fore.  I suspect that this issue will depend on 
country-specific considerations, although global variables, like the EMBI, are likely to be 
common to most optimal policy rules. 
Needless to say, countries that aspire to have an independent monetary policy should aim 
at creating the conditions for eliminating Domestic Liability Dollarization and other financial 
vulnerabilities.  This is not an easy task if it is going to be carried out on a voluntary basis.  In the 
meantime, EMs will have to grapple with the kind of financial vulnerabilities highlighted in 
these notes.
28 
                                                 
28  Absent from these notes, incidentally, is any reference to banking regulation, and issues such as restrictions on 
capital mobility, which may attenuate or exacerbate financial vulnerabilities.  These are important issues that are 
better left for a separate note. 
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Data Appendix 
 
The sample covers all developing countries included in World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Due to lack of data on Reserves, Exports or Imports, a few countries were dropped. The final list 
of countries includes 161 countries. The sample period spans from 1990 to 2004. Data are 
collected on a monthly basis unless otherwise stated. The following table contains all data 
definitions and sources. 
 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources 
EMBI Index  Emerging Markets Bond Index Spread (daily.)  (Source: JP Morgan) 
Volatility of EMBI  Constructed by calculating the standard deviation of daily EMBI spread within a 
given month. 
International Reserves in USD (RES)  International Reserves minus Gold in USD.  International Reserves minus Gold 
in SDR  multiplied by USD per SDR exchange rate. (Source: IFS, |line 
1L.SZF|*|line 111..AA.ZF...|) 
Nominal Exchange Rate (EXR)  Exchange Rate National Currency per USD. (Source: IFS |line AE.ZF|) 
Exports  Value of Exports in USD. (Source: IFS |line 70DZF| or DOTS |line 
70..DZD001|) 
Imports  Value of Imports in USD. (Source: IFS |line 71DZF|  or DOTS |line 
71..DZD001|) 
Capital Flows Proxy  Trade balance minus changes in international reserves. All figures are expressed 
in 2000 
US dollars.  
Sudden Stop Dummy (SSD)  Episodes of Sudden Stop (SS) were detected in a country-by-country basis by 
selecting periods of large and unexpected falls in Capital Flows Proxy; see Calvo 
et al. (2004) for a general discussion of the methodology. Different from Calvo et 
al.(2004), the SS dummy was calculated without imposing any requirement about 
economic activity. 
Exchange Rate Regime (EXRR)  3-way De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes (annual) (Source: 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP_USD)  Gross Domestic Product current prices in USD (annual) (Source: WDI)  
Pre-crisis level of RES (PCRES)  Level of RES one month prior a SS, i.e. SSD=1.  
Minimum level of RES during SS (MINRES)  Minimum level of RES during a window of continuum SS, i.e. SSD=1. 
Maximum Loss of Reserves during SS  Calculated  as  the percentage difference between MINRES and PCRES: 
100*(MINRES/PCRES-1) 
Maximum Loss of Reserves/GDP during  SS  Calculated as: 100*(MINRES-PCRES)/GDP_USD. To avoid endogeneity 
problems, 1-year lagged GDP_USD is used. 
Pre-crisis level of EXR (PCEXR)  Level of EXR one month prior a SS, i.e. SSD=1. 
Maximum level of EXR during SS (MAXEXR) Maximum level of EXR during a window of continuum SS, i.e. SSD=1. 
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Technical Appendix 




















c &  Euler equation     (A2) 
and 
), ( c y b − = π &   Staggered prices,      (A3) 
where the instantaneous utility function is given by v(m) + u(c); m and c stand, respectively, for 
real monetary balances and consumption (there is no capital accumulation).  Moreover, i, ρ, π 
and  y  stand, respectively, for the central bank interest rate, the subjective rate of discount, the 
rate of inflation, and full-capacity output.  Calvo (1983) shows that if i is exogenously given and 
money supply is endogenous (strict interest rate targeting), then, by (A1), m is determined once c 
is known.  Moreover, by (A2) and (A3), the determination of c and π is independent of m.  Thus, 
one can solve for c and π from equations (A2) and (A3).  Notice that the initial values of c and π 
are not predetermined.  Hence, uniqueness requires that system (A2) and (A3) in c and π be 
unstable around the steady state.  However, Calvo (1983) shows that the system displays saddle-
path stability, implying that there is a continuum of initial conditions (c0 , π0) that give rise to a 
convergent equilibrium path, even though prices are sticky. 
  Consider now the case mentioned in the text in which i = φ(π,c).  If φπ > 1 and φc > 0, 
then the sign pattern of the Jacobian, J, associated with the linear expansion of (A2)-(A3) around 










.       ( A 4 )    22
Thus, Determinant J > 0 and Trace J > 0, implying that the two characteristic roots have positive 
real parts.  Hence, system (A1)-(A2) is locally unstable, and the unique initial vector (c0 , π0) 
consistent with an equilibrium that converges to the steady state (the standard rational 
expectations’ local equilibrium definition) is the steady state.  On the other hand, if φπ < 1, the 
upper right cell in (A4) is negative, implying saddle-path stability and, hence, that equilibrium 
nonuniqueness prevails.  This proves the contention in the text.   23
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